SOME ASPECTS OF THE RULE OF REPRESENTATION.
Possibly one of the most extended, as it is one of the most
elementary, principles of our jurisprudence, is that everybody who has not forfeited his rights or status, or been deprived of them through his own inability to enforce them, is
entitled to have the aid of a court in asserting them, and is
equally entitled to the aid of a court in defending himself
against the assertion of the rights of some other person; and
indeed, the rights of those who have not of their own motion
the ability to invoke the aid of a court are so safeguarded
that they may not be affected except under the supervision of
a court. The courts of different jurisdictions may be differently constituted, and the quality of justice dispensed may
vary in different communities; yet, whatever differences
may exist in the conception of justice or whatever infirmities
may occur in its practical administration, the right of everybody to have his cause heard is recognized as one of those
basic rights which are accepted alike in forensic discussion
and in the opinions of grave and able judges.
Notwithstanding the generality of the right to be heard,
it is not without some well-established exceptions, in which
persons whose rights are being litigated may not only not
be heard, or notified so that they may be heard, but even are
not permitted to be heard. It is with respect to some
aspects of these exceptions that this article is written.
Contrary to the general rule, therefore, it has been definitely determined that there are cases in which for one reason
or another the interests of a person not a party to the proceeding may be adjudicated, because they are substantially
identical with the interests of someone else who is a party,
and whose rights will be adjudicated in it. A creditor's
bill is an instance of this character. Some actions against
unincorporated associations furnish other instances. In
such cases, the rights of the person who is not a party are
said to be represented by the person with identical interests
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who is a party, and the rule, or exception to the rule, which
permits it, is called the rule of representation or of virtual
representation.
The particular class of cases to which attention is here
directed, in which the rule of representation is invoked,
relates to instances of divided interests in real estate, where,
in litigation concerning the land, only certain of the holders
of present interests are required to be made parties, and the
rights of the holders of other and more remote interests
are adjudicated because they are presumed to be represented
by the owners who do appear as parties.
It is manifest that in the event of a complex settlement,
it would be extremely burdensome to bring into court the
holders of remote interests which in many cases are of
almost illusory value. Indeed, at the date of application
to court for the relief sought, the persons who ultimately
get the property may be unborn. It is quite impracticable
that the court should be -without the power to grant the
relief until the birth of issue or the final determination of
the class who may become entitled.
The question has also been considered with reference to
estates held in trust. In a sense, the trustee represents
all cestui que trusts, and perhaps completely represents them
so far as relates merely to what may be called the current
administration of the trust, but in litigation concerning
the disposition of the corpus of the trust estate, as in cases
of the sale or mortgage of lands held in trust, requiring
the authority of the court, the trustee does not represent
the cestui que trusts to the extent that the representation, on
the record, of those in esse may be dispensed with.
An early statement of the rule of representation, as applicable to the question under discussion, was given in Hopkins v. Hopkins, I Atk. 580 (1738), where Lord Hardwicke
says that
"it is an established rule that it is sufficient to bring the trustees
before the court together with him in whom the first remainder of
the inheritance is vested, and all that come after will be bound by
the decree though not in esse, unless there be fraud and collusion
between the trustees and the first person in whom a remainder
of inheritance is vested."
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An examination of this case will disclose that the statement of the rule was given by way of illustration, and not as
affecting the question to be decided. It is none the less an
explicit statement bf an established practice, and has been
generally so referred to in later cases. The facts in that
case were that a testator devised his estate to trustees in
trust for Samuel, the only son of his cousin John, for life,
and on Samuel's decease, for the first and every other son of
his body to be begotten successively and the heirs male of
the body of every such son respectively, and for want of"
such issue, if John should have other sons, then to them
upon like limitations and so through his daughters and
finally to his cousin Hannah. The remainderman ultimately entitled brought his bill for a settlement by the trustees and an account of profits. The case turned on the
sufficiency of the trust estate to support contingent remainders and is frequently cited to establish such sufficiency.
The complex character of the limitations appealed to the
humor of the chancellor, who remarked that the testator
could not frame a will whereby no one should take his estate,
otherwise, it is likely he would have done it. The reason of
the need of a particular estate to support contingent remainders was stated to be that there must be a tenant of the
freehold to perform services, to answer to a precipe and
all writs to be brought concerning the realty, or otherwise
there would be a failure of public service and public justice;
and that in equitable estates the trustee performs this function. This statement has been rather unwarrantably quoted
to support the position that the trustee is the representative
of the cestui que trusts for all purposes.1
In Finch v. Finch, 2 Ves. 491 (752), much the same
statement of the rule is given, and the same suggestion, by
way of explanation, of the necessity for the rule. A bill
was filed for the execution of the trusts under the will of
Lord Nottingham. The bill was by Edward, a younger
son, and his son, praying that Henry, the elder brother,
make discovery whether he was married and had any issue
male. Lord Hardwicke recognized that one of the purposes
Barclay v. Lewis 67 Pa. St. 319.
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of the discovery was to make the proceedings effective, and
said:
"It is admitted to be necessary to bring the first person entitled to
the remainder and inheritance of the estate, if such is in being. It
is true if there is none such in whom the remainder of the inheritance
is vested, in being (as if none of the sons of this family had issue
male at all), then it is impossible to say the creditors are to remain
unpaid and the trust not to be executed until a son is born. If there
is no first son born, the court must take the facts as they stand."

This case seems to intimate that it would be sufficient
in the absence of remaindermen in esse to bring in the life
tenant only.
In Reynoldson v. Perkins,Ambler 564 (1769), it appeared
that a testator had devised mortgaged land to his son and
his heirs, but in case his son should die without issue then
to his three daughters. A foreclosure of the mortgage was
had under a bill in which the daughters were not joined.
Subsequently a bill to redeem was filed by one who had
bought a daughter's share for a trifle, a fact not without
influence on the judgment of the court, which characterized
the bill as an experiment. The rule was stated to be that
"the first tenant being a party to the bill was sufficient. He sustained the interest of everybody and those in remainder were considered as ciphers. It would be very inconvenient if the remaindermen were necessarily to be parties."

The reason for the rule is here clearly its convenience,
not that the holder of the first vested estate of inheritance
possessed some actual right to represent those who should
come after.
The next and perhaps the most important case is Lloyd
v. Johnes, 9 Ves. Jr. 37 (I8o3), both as illustrating the
inherent difficulties of the question and as pointing out what
was then regarded as the real reason of the rule as stated
by Lord Hardwicke. There was an appointment in 1744
by Thomas Pryse with successive limitations in favor of
John Pugh Pryse for life and to his first and other sons in
tail male, then to Lewis Pryse and his sons, then to James
Lewis and his sons in tail male, with remainder to Thomas
Lloyd and the heirs male of his body. The bill was filed
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in 1799 by the eldest son of Thomas Lloyd, the intermediate
limitations having failed. It appeared that in 1766 John
Pugh Pryse through the connivance of his solicitor had
procured a sale of the estate to one Johnes, which sale
proved subsequently to have been fraudulent. In 1776
proceedings were begun for a common recovery but never
consummated. If these proceedings had been-completed
the plaintiff in 1799 would have been barred. Lord Eldon,
in discussing whether the plaintiff should have continued the
old proceedings or should file a new bill, emphasized the
difficulty of the subject.
"The question," he said, "involves a subject to which from the
difficulties it presents to my mind after much consideration, I do
not state myself to do justice; what are the principles and what
are and ought to be the doctrines with respect to a suit in this court
by a prior tenant in tail as affecting subsequent remaindermen, and by
existing remaindermen, as affecting or not the rights of persons
subsequently coming in esse but having interests prior to those upon
whose interests the bill is filed. The subject is pregnant with great
difficulty. It has been so treated by those who have considered it
most; and I do now allude to Lord Redesdale's Book, which is a
wonderful effort to collect what is to be deduced from authorities
speaking so little what is clear, that the surprise is not from the
difficulty of understanding all he has said, but that so much can ibe
understood. . . . There are very few decided cases upon this which
are intelligible, none sufficiently intelligible to require much attention
except the two cases referred to by Lord Redesdale in Brown's
Parliamentary cases, and it is very dangerous to trust to loose
doctrines in old cases, before it was established, for convenience, that
it is sufficient to bring the first tenant in tail before the court."

He then discussed the question whether there is a distinction between the case where the plaintiff comes in by

way of succession (as a son of a tenant in tail) or by way
of new limitation (as in the present case) and concluded
that the difference was not considerable. This distinction
is, however, made much of in a more recent case.1 Then,
with more particular reference to the matter now under discussion, Lord Eldon added:
"A Court of Equity in many cases considers the tenant in tail
as having the whole estate vested in him, at least for the purpose
of suit, and for those purposes does not look beyond the estate
tail in a suit, aiming by the decree to bind the right to the land.
I distinguish between cases where the suit is founded upon contract
'Baylor's Lessees v. Dejarnette, x3 Grattan 152.
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by the tenant in tail, and a suit to bind the land in respect to
charges created by the author of the gift and imposing them therefore upon all who take per formam doni. In the latter the remainderman has a clear interest in the event of the suit of the prior tenant
in tail"

With respect to this question, therefore, he holds that

while there is no judgment in point, yet if it be taken that
the first tenant in tail represents the inheritance, then those
whose interests the tenant in tail represents ought to have
the benefit and bear the disadvantage of testimony given
before the hearing; the degree of advantage cannot affect
the principle. Notwithstanding, however, the right of the
plaintiff to maintain a new bill, he refused to disturb the
fraudulent sale because
"these

(the fraudulent acts)

being the acts of two tenants in tail

at the time who might have suffered recoveries of the rest of the
estate, it is very difficult at this period to impeach the sale."

Thus it will be seen that the reason assigned by Lord
Eldon for the rule was at one time convenience, and at
another time the power which lingered in the first tenant in
tail to bar the remaindermen by suffering a recovery. In
the somewhat earlier case of Fletcherv. Toliet, 5 Ves. Jr. 3
(1799), Lord Loughborough had held that in case arising

after a lapse of forty years the court would not go beyond
the tenant in tail in possession and hold it necessary to
make the reversioner a party; but this case does not shed
much light on the rule.
In Gifford v. Hort, I Sch. & Lef. 386 (i8o4), a bill
was filed by a remainderman under a settlement made in
z739 against one in possession who derived his title through
a fraudulent sale. In i8oi a tenant in tail who was a
predecessor in title of the plaintiff had proceeded in the
Exchequer, which for some reason had dismissed his bill.
Lord Redesdale held the case over in order to permit the
plaintiff to apply to the House of Lords for leave to appeal
from the Exchequer decree by making himself a party by
supplemental bill. The House of Lords referred the matter
to a committee, and the appeal was allowed. In discussing
the matter in the Court of Chancery, Lord Redesdale had
said:
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"It having been repeatedly determined that if there be a tenant
for life, remainder to the first son in tail, remainder over, and he
is brought before the court before he has issue, the contingent
remaindermen are barred; this is now considered the settled rule
of the courts of equity and of necessity; the danger of holding
otherwise in the present case would induce me to hesitate very
much even if I thought there was less of authority on the subject, but
at the same time I do confess that I do not find the precise, distinct
authority that enables me to say that the point has come completely
in discussion before a court of equity, indeed, the argument shows
that it is not completely so decided."

It is somewhat difficult to determine just what idea is
intended to be conveyed by the court, unless it be that there
was no reasoned decision which determined the rule. The
Supreme Court of the United States in commenting on this
case said that it decided that it was sufficient to bring
before the court the first tenant in tail, although he be an
infant incapable at law of barring remaindermen, for the
reason
"that where all the parties are brought before the Court that can be
brought before it, and the Court acts on the property according
to the rights that appear, without fraud, its decision must of necessity
be final and conclusive."'

Cockburn v. Thompson, x6 Ves. Jr. 326 (i8o9), while
not a decision upon the question, contains so pertinent a
statement by Lord Eldon of the law as it was then understood, that it may be considered. A bill was filed by several
on behalf of themselves and other proprietors of the Philanthropic Annuity Association. Plea for failure to join all
who were named, and giving names of others. Lord Eldon
overruled the plea.
"The strict rule is that all persons materially interested in the
subject of the suit, however numerous, ought to be parties, that there
may be a complete decree between all parties having material interests;
but, that, being a general rule, established for the convenient administration of justice, must not be adhered to in cases to which, consistently with practical convenience, it is incapable of application. Accordingly there are several well-known cases of exception, and without
going through them all, I will mention one instance of not applying
it to persons having valuable interests in real estate, namely, where it
has been held sufficient to bring before the court the first person
having an estate of inheritance, though it cannot be denied that
persons having present immediate valuable interests in the same
"McArthur v Scott, x3 U. S. 340.
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real estate may become most deeply affected by what is done here

in their absence.
"When the court for convenience dispenses with the presence of
parties the principle leads it by future arrangement to find out the
means of giving them an opportunity in some shape of coming in.
The court must always be open to questions upon the carriage
of" the cause, applications for rehearing, &c., and I should upon
principle find the means, if not supplied by precedent, of giving a
creditor coming in after the institution of a suit the opportunity
of supporting his interest better than the plaintiff could:'

The same principle was acted on by the House of Lords
in Gore v. Stackhouse, I Dow. 31 (1813), where a collusive
foreclosure in 1733 was set aside on a bill filed in 1796
by a tenant in tail shortly after his title accrued, and Lord
Eldon there stated that
" It was clear equitable law, that in order to make a foreclosure
valid against all claimants, he who had the first estate of inheritance
must be brought before the court, and even then the intermediate
remaindermen for life ought to be brought before the court to give
them the opportunity of paying off the mortgage if they thought
proper."

The rule was somewhat broadened in its application to a
partition brought by a tenant for life with remainder to his
sons intail, in Gaskil v. Gaskill, 6 Sim. 643 (1836). The
plaintiff had no issue, and the purport of the decision seems
to be that, in such a case, in partition, the decree would be
binding on his sons when in esse. On the other hand, the
rule was limited in Goodess v. Williams, 2 Y. & C. 595
(1843), where it was stated as matter of common understanding that when a person is seised in fee of an estate
having that seisin liable to be defeated by a shifting use,
conditional limitation or executory devise, the inheritance
is not represented merely by the person who has the fee
liable to be defeated. This very clear case omits all consideration of convenience or necessity, and rests its conclusion
on the power of the holder of the first estate of inheritance
to bar subsequent limitations.
In Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Phil. Ch. 506, the rule of representation by the first tenant in tail was held not to apply to
Scotch entails.
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In 1841 the thirtieth General Order was adopted providing that
"in all suits concerning real estate, which is vested in trustees by
devise, and such trustees are competent to sell and give discharges

for the proceeds of the sale, and for the rents and profits of the estate,
such trustees shall represent the persons beneficially interested in
the estate or the proceeds or the rents and profits in the same
manner and to the same extent as the executors or administrators in
suits concerning personal estate represent the persons beneficially
interested in such personal estate; and in such cases it shall not be
necessary to make the persons beneficially interested in such real
estate, or rents and profits, parties to the suit. But the court may
upon consideration of the matter on the hearing, if it shall so think
fit, order such persons to be made parties."

This order was variously interpreted, it being held to
apply where the will gave a power of sale but no power
expressly to give discharges for proceeds of sale 1 and in
cases of suits by parties beneficially interested as well as in
suits by persons tlaiming adversely to the estate,2 but on the
other hand, it was held not to apply in cases in which trustees had only a qualified power of sale.3
It is thus seen that the development of the rule of representation, so far as relates to the matter now under discussion, has advanced from a rather obscure origin, through
a somewhat wavering explanation, now asserting the power
of the first vested estate to bar remote interests, and now
alleging the question to be one of convenience or necessity.
This double view is also expressed by the two text writers
who have most adequitely considered the question, with the
further qualification that generally where contingent remaindermen are in esse, their presence cannot safely be dispensed
with.
In Mitford on Equity Pleadings 174, the rule is laid down
as follows:
"Contingent limitations and executory devises to persons not in
being, may in like manner be bound by a decree against a person
claiming a vested estate of inheritance, but a person in being claiming
by way of executory devise and not subject to any preceding vested
estate of inheritance by which it may be defeated, must be made a
'Savery v. Barber, 4 Hare 125.
'Osbourne v. Foreman, 2 Hare 656.
'Lloyd v. Smith, 13 Sim. 457; Miller v. Huddlestone, '3 Sim. 467.
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party to a bill affecting his rights (citing here authorities). These
authorities establish the doctrine that while, as a general rule, the
contingent remaindermen are necessary parties, yet where they are
not in esse at the time and there is before the court a person entitled
to a prior vested estate of inheritance, then, if the persons entitled to
the prior life estate and the trustee are parties, the court may make
a decree that will conclude the rights of such contingent remaindermen, but they do not warrant the idea that contingent remaindermen
who are in esse and can be made parties can be safely dispensed with."

In Calvert on Parties p. 49 the rule is stated somewhat
differently as follows:
"This modification of the general rule has been adopted on the
grounds partly of necessity, partly of convenience, and upon a
principle of justice to persons entitled to remote interests."
"Another important principle in favor of the doctrine is that in the
person of the first tenant in tail there is brought before the court one
whose interest is of such a nature as to insure his giving a fair trial
to the legal right This last principle seems to have established the
limit to the number of interests which may be represented by the
person entitled to the first estate of inheritance. . . . They are
interests which depend upon the first estate which, together with that
estate, make up the fee simple. . . they are interests which the
tenant in tail can destroy and which for that very reason there is a
special propriety in empowering him to defend."
"Those persons only will be considered as represented, either by
the tenant in tail or by the tenant for life, whose interests such
tenant in tail or the child of such tenant for life would have the power
of barring."

And again on p. 193 the power of barring is assigned as the
real reason.
Coming now to the American authorities, much the same
divergence of view is observable. Both reasons are
assigned for the rule, and the same distinction between contingent remaindermen in esse and those not in esse is noticeable, and the further distinction between suits affecting the
trust property and those not affecting the relation of the
cestui que trusts to it.
The question was considered at some length in McArthur
v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340 (1884), in which a testator devised
to his executors in trust to pay the income to his children
and their issue until the youngest grandchild who might live
should reach the age of twenty-one. After that and the
decease of all his children, the lands were to be inherited
equally by his grandchildren, or their children, if deceased.
This was held to create equitable vested remainders in the
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grandchildren subject to open to let in grandchildren born
after testator's death and subject to be divested as to any
grandchild dying during the pendency of the particular
estate leaving children. A statute of Ohio authorized the
probate of the will, but allowed an appeal by bill. Such bill
was filed by a son and his children in esse against the other
children and their children in esse, and the children were
appointed guardians ad litem. By what was apparently a
consent decree the probate was reversed. It was held in a
subsequent and much later proceeding by a grandchild born
after testator's death, that the trustees were necessary parties
and that there was no one on the record to represent the
unborn grandchildren and great grandchildren.
The discussion took a wide range. It was held that the
general rule was that all the members of a class of residuary
legatees or next of kin must be made parties, but that where
they are numerous and the court is satisfied that it has
enough before it to secure a fair trial of the issue, it may
proceed to a hearing, the decree probably being without
prejudice to the rights of those who are not made parties or
who do not come in before decree; and that often a trustee
with large powers sufficiently represents the beneficiaries.
In Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 171 (1875), the distinction
is recognized between suits which are brought to recover
the trust property or reduce it to possession and in no wise
affect the relation between the trustee and his beneficiaries,
in which it is unnecessary to make them parties, and suits
in which that relation is involved.
In Campbellv. Stokes, 148 N. Y. 23 (1894), there was a
bill for partition of lands held upon limitations similar to
those in McArthur v. Scott, and it was held that whether
the remainders were vested or contingent the persons in being when the partition action was commenced and presumptively entitled to possession on the death of the life tenant
were necessary parties, and in Leggett v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 64 Barb. 23, the same principle was asserted with
respect to a foreclosure proceeding and it was held that
the trustees could not and did not represent the grandchildren. In Nodine v. Greenfield, 7 Paige 544, in a foreclos-
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ure bill it was held that parties having vested estates in
remainder subject to open must be joined, but that as to
future or contingent estates it was sufficient to bring in the
first vested estate of inheritance.
In Smith v. Gaines, 39 N. J. Eq. 545, and Tyson v.
Applegate, 4o N. J. Eq. 305, the same view was taken. In
the former it was held that in the absence of a present
absolute power of sale in the trustee, the cestui que trusts
must be parties, and the court stated that the rule of representation was incapable of definition and that much must
be left to the discretion of the court. In the latter, it was
held that all cestui que trusts must be joined where they are
not so numerous as to make it impossible and highly inconvenient to include them. These conclusions are based
solely on convenience or necessity.
In Long v. Long, 62 Md. 33 (1883), the other reason
for the rule was impliedly given. The will limited the land
to trustees for certain children for life and on their death
for their children. In 1833 a bill was filed for the sale of
the land and all the children joined. In 188o a bill for
partition was filed on the theory that the grandchildren
were not concluded by the earlier proceedings and it was
so held, although it was contended that the children were
the heirs at law and represented the unborn grandchildren.
The court followed the rule of Goodess v. Williams, 2 Y. &
C. 595, that where a person holds an estate liable to be
defeated by a shifting use, conditional limitation or executory devise, the inheritance is not represented except as
against himself or those who take under him; but that it is
otherwise with respect to personal estate and then especially
those not in esse are bound.
In Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, it was held that
remaindermen are not represented by a life tenant and a
trustee, but otherwise where the owners of the particular
estate and the first vested estate in remainder are joined.
In Harrison v. Walton, 95 Va. 721, in a proceeding to
charge real estate with debts, all the remaindermen in esse
were brought in and this was held sufficient under the rule
of Gifford v. Hort; and in Baylor's Lessees v. Dejarnette,
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13 Grattan 152, a contingent remainderman not in esse at the
inception of the suit, and who came into being before decree,
but was not joined, was nevertheless barred and the rule
was stated that where the first vested estate of inheritance
is joined, a contingent remainderman is barred whether in
esse or not, and where there is no vested estate of inheritance
it is sufficient to bring in the life tenant and especially where
the contingent remainderman is the son of the life tenant.
It can scarcely be deduced from the cases, however, that
parenthood is a sufficient basis of representation. In a later
case Faulkner v. Davis, 18 Grattan 651, while following,
in the main, the earlier case, the court regarded the rule
as requiring all parties in being to be brought in, the rule
being said to be one of necessity and convenience.
In Mosely v. Hankinson, 22 S. C. 323 (1884), the court
held that the general rule was that contingent remaindermen
are necessary parties if in esse, but that where they are not
in esse it is sufficient to bring the owner of the prior estate
of inheritance, or perhaps if there is no prior vested estate
of inheritance then the life tenant and the trustees.
In Hall v. Hall, 146 Ill. 246, the convenience rule is followed to the end that unborn contingent remaindermen are
barred by a decree which disposes of interests of living contingent remaindermen of like character, and this theory
receives further emphasis in Denegre v. Walker, 114 Ill.
App. 240 (19o4), where it was held that if all parties in esse
are joined the decree will bind those not in esse, as their
interests are identical with those in being; it being stated
that the opposite rule would sacrifice the rights of the .living
to those of posterity. Attention, however, was called to
the fact that the application was merely to execute a lease
to carry out the intention of the testator and not to convert
real estate into personalty, a thing not to be done except
under urgent necessity.
In North Carolina, the rule of convenience is followed
but restricted, and it has been held that there must be one
of each class of remaindermen before the court.
In Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 305, the right of representation by the holder of the first estate of inheritance was

THE RULE OF REPRESENTATION.

659

recognized only when that estate was vested and that the
rule did not apply to contingent remaindermen.
In Pennsylvania the questions under discussion are largely
referable to the Act of April 18, 1853, known as the Price
Act. This provides that all persons having a present or
expectant interest in the premises must be joined, and while
considerable laxity of practice was formerly usual, there can
be little doubt of the necessity of complying with the express
provisions of the Act. The explanatory comments on the
Act by its draughtsman enforce this view.1 Prior to this,
the partition Act of June 3, 184o, expressly provided for the
protection in such proceedings of unborn children, usually
accomplished by a trustee of record to represent them.
A review of the cases thus discloses the absence of any
consistent rule for the determination of the question of
parties or if a rule be assumed to exist, the absence of any
consistent explanation of it. It seems clear that the necessity for the appearance of remote remaindermen has been
generally dispensed with, but it is not in the least clear that
any established rule has been followed by which to determine when or to what extent such appearance has been
deemed unnecessary. The equitable practice which permitted the holder of the first vested estate of inheritance to
represent subsequent interests dependent on it has the advantage of definiteness, but is open to two objections. In the
first place it hinges upon the theory that the holder of such
estate has the power of destroying the subsequent estates,
for instance by a common recovery. Such power either
no longer exists or else has fallen into such disuse as to be
no longer logically available as the explanation of a living
principle. The fact that estates tail may be barred, as in
Pennsylvania, by deed or judicial sale is scarcely better explanation of a rule which was established long before the
statutes authorizing these. methods of barring, and which
prevails in jurisdictions where such statutes do not exist.
Even under such a statute as the Price Act of Pennsylvania,
where land may be relieved of a contingent remainder or
executory devise, these estates are not destroyed but are
' Price on Act Relating to Real Estate.
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transferred to the fund produced by the sale or mortgage of
the land, and it is probably necessary in order to accomplish
this result that the holders of such estates, if in esse, should
be made parties to the proceedings.1 In the second place,
this practice does not cover all of the cases which are likely
to arise, and some other theory must be adopted for the
cases not included. It has been seen that inasmuch as shifting uses or executory devises, or generally those estates
which are not subject to destruction at the hands of the
holder of the first estate of inheritance, cannot be disposed
of by such a practice, some other rule must be adopted.
The second view, that of convenience, or necessity, while
somewhat vague in its application, would nevertheless seem
to be the one, perhaps the only one, which is now actually
available. Even in some of the older cases it is referred
to as an explanation of the decree of the court conjointly
with the other view, possibly on the theory that the first
vested estate of inheritance was a convenient or necessary
stopping-place in the search for parties. If, however, it is
recognized as the true explanation of the practice, it would
seem dangerous -to adopt an easy standard which in one
aspect is a false one.
Is there any standard outside of the discretion of the
chancellor on the question of convenience or necessity for
the determination of parties in this class of litigation? It
would seem that there is.
In the first place, in all questions touching the administration of trust estates, as distinguished from questions relating to charges upon the estate itself or the conversion
of the corpus of the estate, there would seem to be no necessity for joining any one beyond the trustees themselves
in whom has been vested that administration. While, to
some extent, remaindermen are interested, yet their interest
is slight in comparison with the hardship of requiring persons dealing with trustees on matters of administration to
bring in all parties who have or may come to have an
interest in the estate.
In all other matters, the question is, whether convenience
'Smith v. Schwarz, 2o9 Pa. St. 79.
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or necessity shall be the guiding principle. Convenience of
legal administration may properly be sought, where the only
effect of inconvenience is mere inconvenience to litigants
in the assertion of legal rights; but where convenience of
legal administration involves either a refusal of such rights
or an omission to consider them, it is manifest that convenience becomes an extremely unsafe guide. Then what
is the significance of necessity in such cases? Merely that
all persons should be made parties who are in esse, and who
at the inception of the litigation would become entitled if the
contingencies of the devise or settlement then happened or
definitely failed, regardless of the improbability of such
event. Such a rule is definite and in accord with the fundamental principle of the law which preserves to every one his
legal rights until he is judicially deprived of. them after a
hearing; and while it must be confessed that some of the
cases do not adopt it, some do, and it has been now more
than a century since Lord Redesdale said that the authorities
did not warrant the idea that contingent remaindermen who
were in esse and who could be made parties could be safely
dispensed with.
L. L. Smith.

